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Christian democratic parties help to create a distinct type of welfare state 
and social policy characterized by class compromise and the involvement of non-
governmental societal institutions. The presence of Christian democratic parties 
accounts for a distinct type of policy outcomes which are unique to states 
influenced by this movement. Welfare policy can sometimes be simplified into a 
sort of zero-sum approach where either the workers win or the employers win and 
either the state intervenes or we leave it all up to the free market. Christian 
democracy steps beyond this dichotomy and offers a unique alternative point of 
view which, when translated into policy, has roles for various institutions and 
members of all classes. 
Owing to the uniquely confessional nature of the movement there are 
multiple means through which Christian democrats are able to exert influence, 
specifically through ideas, social structures, and the formal political process. The 
welfare state Christian democracy produces is characterized by the prominence of 
social institutions in delivering benefits, meaning that churches, families, and other 
such structures are enabled to deliver services rather than the state being the 
primary provider. Also, inter-class dialogue is institutionalized so that class 
relations are handled through official channels rather than through conflict and 
collective bargaining. Furthermore, the overall economic system employed by 
Christian democrats is social capitalism, a middle way between left and right 
economic policies which focuses on competition and the value of labor as well as 
on a social safety net. These are a unique set of policies and this paper will seek to 
explain the forces which cause this set of policy outcomes. 
It is the basis of the Christian democrats in Christian principles and doctrine 
which uniquely shapes the policies they advocate. Catholics in particular have the 
benefit of access to centuries of comprehensive thinking and writing from the 
church on a vast array of social issues; when developing a political platform, 
Christians simply step into one of the most important and well-developed streams 
of thinking available. This thinking is the primary force that drives the compromise 
between classes and societal structures, emphasizing the importance of the 
individual and community, work and stability. Christianity also provides social 
structures beyond mere political parties as evidenced by the existence not only of 
churches but also of schools, hospitals, and other institutions which are able to 
participate in the implementation of social policy. These structures ensure that 
policy is implemented in a way consistent with Christian democratic thinking. 
Finally, as a political party Christian democrats have a unique influence because 
they occupy such a broad space in the center of the political spectrum, enabled by 
religion‟s ability to cut across traditional class divisions and unite otherwise 
disparate sets of people and interests. This centrist position both derives from and 
further enables Christian democratic policies of class compromise like social 
capitalism. As a result of these three means of influence, Christian democracy is 
able to conceive of and carry out a type of welfare policy which is distinct from 
that which is produced in the absence of such a party.  
This paper will explore the areas of doctrine, social institutions, and actual 
political parties which influence the Christian democratic welfare state, focusing 
particularly on the Dutch case. An interesting distinction of the Dutch case is that it 
allows for internal comparison since it historically prominent confessional parties 
declined in influence in the postwar period, thus offering the possibility to observe 
the changes in welfare policy that occurred alongside the shift away from Christian 
democratic political power. To a lesser degree the Swedish and American cases are 
also referenced for the sake of further comparison because of their overall lack of a 
prominent Christian democratic movement as well as their adoption of quite 
expansive and limited welfare states, respectively.  
 
The Christian Democratic Conception of Welfare Policy 
Christian Democrats impact policy through ideas and doctrine that offer a 
unique view of how welfare policy ought to be done. Foundational to the Christian 
democratic approach to social issues are the Catholic concepts of subsidiarity, 
solidarity, and personalism. All of these concepts are political in the sense that they 
deal with how people ought to live together in community. Specifically, all of these 
key principles emphasize both the individual and the community, which leads to 
the unique Christian democratic approach to welfare that emphasizes societal 
institutions, social programs, and work, as well as appropriate relations between all 
of these devices. The result of these concepts is policies that include societal 
institutions prominently, and economic approaches involving corporatism and 
social capitalism. In examining these fundamental tenets of Christian democratic 
thinking it will become clear that Christian democracy is not merely a political 
party but a movement that embodies an entirely distinctive way of looking at 
society. More than just a political agenda, Christianity offers a normative 
understanding of people and society and their appropriate roles which makes 
specific demands on how policy is ultimately done. The result is an emphasis on 
societal institutions, inclusion, and compromise all of which is centered on the 
inherent dignity of the person as a creation made in God‟s image. 
The concept of subsidiarity is clearly articulated in the papal encyclical 
Quadragesimo Anno, where Pope Pius XI writes, “Just as it is gravely wrong to 
take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and 
industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time 
a grave evil and disturbance of the right order to assign to a greater or higher 
association what a lesser and subordinate organization can do.” Two aspects of this 
principle are important to note for their impact on welfare policy. First is the belief 
that society has a right order which can be disturbed if tasks are taken on by the 
wrong institution. The principle of subsidiarity establishes that certain societal 
institutions have proper tasks which would be inappropriate if performed by a 
different institution. Not only does this serve as a way of restraining which roles 
can properly be taken on by the state or other organizations, but it also means 
positively that there are certain tasks for which these institutions are responsible. In 
other words, not only is the community not to take on the task which belongs to the 
individual, but in fact the individual has a responsibility to this task as their own 
proper assigned task within the right order. In discussing welfare policy this means 
that the questions of institutional differentiation and responsibility are very 
important for Christian democrats. For example, a school cannot take on the task of 
raising a child since that is a task appropriate for the family and to some degree the 
church. Subsidiarity demands that careful thought be given when determining how 
social benefits will be delivered since it is very important that proper tasks be 
assigned to their appropriate societal organizations. 
The second important aspect of the principle of subsidiarity adds on to this 
idea by actually prescribing a particular role for the state as subsidiary to the other 
intermediary institutions of society. The implication of this notion of a subsidiary 
state envisions simultaneously negative and positive roles for government. 
Negatively, the state is not to interfere with the ability of intermediary institutions 
to do their tasks and it must not take on for itself tasks which are actually proper to 
other institutions. Positively, the state has an obligation not only to allow societal 
institutions to perform their tasks but also to actively enable those institutions to do 
so. This has clear implications for welfare policy, as the state can neither be the 
sole actor (or even the major one) nor can it completely step back into a hands-off 
position. Furthermore, the specific role for the state envisioned in Catholic social 
thought requires care for the common good, as described in Pope Leo XIII‟s 
influential encyclical Rerum Novarum,  
 
“It is altogether necessary that there be some who dedicate themselves to the 
service of the State, who make laws, who dispense justice, and finally, by 
whose counsel and authority civil and military affairs are administered. These 
men, as is clear, play the chief role in the State, and among every people are to 
be regarded as occupying first place, because they work for the common good 
most directly and pre-eminently” (Sec. 50). 
 
The common good is multi-faceted, and includes both enabling and ensuring that 
community organizations perform their proper roles and intervening to correct or 
even to actively supplement when an institution fails to perform its proper task. In 
conjunction with subsidiarity, the goal of the state is never to actively take on more 
roles for itself but instead to ensure that institutions are properly performing their 
proper roles and to enable this when necessary.  
For the purpose of welfare, this essentially means that the state should not be 
the main actor in the provision of social assistance but rather play a role in 
assisting other organizations like churches and schools to take on that task for 
itself. Only when other organizations are failing to care for the poor does the state 
need to become involved, and even then it should only be to reinforce the 
institutions which are failing, never to take away the authority of those institutions. 
Practically, the principle of subsidiarity means that intermediary institutions in 
society take on a much greater role in the provision of services than in any other 
welfare model. A more social democratic model has a larger, more redistributive 
state, and a more liberal model would have a state which was not empowered to 
correct failures, especially from the market. The Christian democratic model, by 
comparison, has a state which intervenes in the interest of the common good, 
helping to build up community organizations.  
Furthermore, subsidiarity results in the Christian democratic economic 
policy known as social capitalism, which is a system that incorporates both market 
forces and state intervention. Essentially, the market‟s efficiency and competition 
is utilized, but the state is empowered to intervene and correct market failures, both 
in the form of excessive wealth and in the form of poverty (van Kersbergen 1994, 
40). Again, this is a clear demonstration of the Christian democratic principle of 
subsidiarity as it allows no one institution sweeping control over policy or society. 
The market is given a place, but the state is again present as a check to make sure 
that market forces do not interfere with the common good. This approach is unique 
to Christian democracy and comes as a direct result of the Catholic social thought 
which underlies the movement. 
Solidarity as a principle in Catholic social thought implies unity between all 
members of society. In Laborem Exercens, Pope John Paul II speaks to the 
Catholic understanding of the class struggle,  
 
“Even if in controversial questions the struggle takes on a character of 
opposition towards others, this is because it aims at the good of social 
justice, not for the sake of “struggle” or in order to eliminate the opponent. It 
is characteristic of work that it first and foremost unites people. In this 
consists its social power: the power to build a community. In the final 
analysis, both those who work and those who manage the means of 
production or who own them must in some way be united in this 
community” (Sec. 20).  
 
The concept of solidarity means that it is not just the state but all members of 
society that have a responsibility to the common good. There ought not to be any 
antagonism between members of society because all have a mutual investment in 
the common good. Furthermore, beyond just a lack of enmity there ought to be real 
community and cooperation between members of society. This is true both in 
general and specifically in terms of economics, where the principle of solidarity 
requires class compromise and cooperation. This is unique from the approach in 
other welfare states where conflict is fought along class lines. The policy result of 
the application of solidarity is what is called corporatism, where collective 
bargaining on the part of labor is replaced with formal negotiations between 
representatives of labor, business, and the state to facilitate cooperation and 
compromise between these factions so that an end result might be beneficial for all 
involved.  
The concept of solidarity is closely tied to that of personalism, which is “the 
idea that one becomes a person through one‟s relationship to others” (Stjerno 74). 
While Christians believe that all people have dignity and value as individuals by 
virtue of their creation in God‟s image, it is equally important to realize that God 
also created people as innately social beings who are only able to fully flourish in 
community. An inherent part of humanity in the Catholic conception is 
participation in society and its institutions. This complements the idea of solidarity 
by reminding us that while we are to participate in society, institutions are 
ultimately for the sake of uplifting the individual. While belonging to a community 
is necessary for human fulfillment, ultimately communities exist for the sake of 
people and not vice versa; the individual and their inherent dignity must take 
precedence over the ends of any particular group. Again this results in the limiting 
of both the state and the market because the dignity of the person acts as a check 
on the power of each. The individual cannot be allowed to fall into poverty through 
a market failure, so the state must intervene, but each person must also be given a 
dignified role in society which comes largely through work. Personalism is another 
principle which leads to the outcome of social capitalism.    
The combination of these three principles defines the unique Christian 
democratic approach to social policy. Subsidiarity spells out the importance of 
both the state as an actor for the common good and of intermediary institutions in 
carrying out the tasks that promote the common good. Solidarity shows that these 
institutions must work only to promote social cohesion and never to divide people 
or to carry out destructive conflict, instead always working toward compromise. 
Finally, personalism emphasizes the necessity of social participation for individual 
flourishing while also cautioning that the action of intermediary institutions and the 
compromises reached must never come at the expense of individual dignity and in 
fact must actively promote and uplift people. Practically, this means that welfare 
policy for Christian democrats looks vastly different from traditional left and right 
approaches with its corporatism and social capitalism. Perhaps most importantly, 
neither the state nor the market is a primary actor but the intermediary institutions 
take on the responsibility for implementing social policy.  
Looking to the Dutch and Swedish cases we can see how these differences in 
doctrine begin to apply to policy approaches. One clear example is the passive 
nature of the Dutch welfare state as opposed to the active nature of the Swedish 
welfare state. The transfer of benefits in the Netherlands is based on a traditional 
family model which funnels benefits through male breadwinners rather than 
through universal citizen benefits like those found in Sweden (van Kersbergen 
2009, 137). Furthermore, and most clearly in keeping with the principle of 
subsidiarity, institutions like hospitals and schools in the Netherlands are publicly 
funded but kept largely private which allows them to be confessional as well as 
closely tied to the particular needs of the community. This also is a demonstration 
of the state playing a subsidiary role by funding institutions without heavy 
regulation. This stands opposed to Swedish health care policy, for example, which 
is largely state-run and universalistic, granting government a much more expansive 
role. Christian democratic thinking translates into the incorporation of intermediary 
institutions in a prominent role. Furthermore, the mere formation of confessional 
parties which are not class-based is a marked change along the lines suggested by 
the principle of solidarity, as the Swedish welfare debate has largely been framed 
in terms of class struggle and even in Marxist language (Stjerno 129). In offering a 
distinct way of looking at society and its proper order, Christian democracy 
naturally moves into ways of implementing and envisioning social policy which 
are unique from other parties. By virtue of the specific nature of Christian teaching 
it follows that the Christian democratic approach must be characterized not by 
free-market liberalism or statist interventionism but instead by an important role 
for intermediary institutions and class compromise. 
 
The Christian Democratic Creation and Use of Social Structures 
Christian democracy influences social policy through its creation of 
comprehensive social structures and bonds. Another unique feature of Christian 
democracy is that, by virtue of its broad underlying doctrine, it is not only a 
political party but a comprehensive social movement. Societies with strong 
Christian democratic presence also have strong confessional intermediary 
institutions. These institutions are not only a result of Christian democratic 
doctrine but are also a contributing factor to how welfare policy is implemented. 
Visser and Hemerijck write that “substantive policy ideals only become effective 
in institutional environments which are able to translate them into concrete 
decisions and feasible strategies of implementation” (54). The existence of social 
organizations means that they can be relied upon to play an important role in the 
delivery of benefits. It also means that they are able to impact the way in which 
policy is interpreted and services are delivered through their role as service 
providers. 
The existence of confessional civil society institutions is extremely 
prominent in the Netherlands. Pillarization characterizes the structure of Dutch 
society and it refers to the segmentation of society according to confession. 
Catholic and Calvinists, the two most prominent Dutch religious denominations, 
have developed strong subcultures, infrastructures, and networks of institutions. 
These pillars comprise of not only churches, schools, and hospitals but even radio 
stations and soccer teams. In short, the pillars are “self-contained life worlds” 
(Ertman 46). In addition to the Christian pillars, Socialists and Liberals have 
developed matching pillars so that Dutch society is comprised not of public 
institutions which compete with confessional institutions but instead almost 
exclusively of ideologically-based institutions. 
A clear effect of these pillars on social policy is that Christian democrats, 
hesitant to be joined into one state in areas like public schools, instead adopted the 
policy of publicly funding all schools. Another telling example is the area of health 
care, where very social democratic states like Sweden rely heavily on public 
insurance and hospitals. The obvious opposite of such an approach might look 
something like the current US approach which relies almost exclusively on private 
insurance. In the Dutch case, however, there is a mix of public and private 
insurance and public funding of confessional hospitals. These examples 
demonstrate the positive approach of Christian democracy to religion. Rather than 
taking an approach which simply seeks not to interfere with confessional 
institutions while favoring secular ones with resources, the Dutch state actively 
supports the public expression of religion through funding. Of course the Dutch 
government does not exclusively fund Christian schools or hospitals, but it also 
does not exclude such organizations from funding. This approach still avoids the 
imposition of a religion on citizens, but it also avoids the forced, artificial 
neutrality which is favored by the exclusive funding of secular institutions. In this 
way Christian democrats allow for the public development of religious convictions 
in a way consistent with the ideals of subsidiarity and personalism (Lamberts 124). 
An interesting testament to the practical impact of these Dutch societal 
institutions comes from examining the effects of the process of depillarization 
which has occurred somewhat steadily since the 1960‟s. Two primary effects can 
be seen as the results of the depillarization process: first, it seems that the decline 
of pillars actually correlates to the decline of the political power of Christian 
democrats and, second, there remains social segregation along ideological lines 
and a continued use of the pillarized institutions even as they secularized (van 
Kersbergen 2009, 140). 
On the correlation between depillarization and the decline in Christian 
democratic prominence in government, Manow and van Kersbergen observe that in 
the face of the secularization of “the Confessional parties could no longer rely on 
the „automatic vote‟ of their pillar members” (140). It is unclear, they warn, 
whether it is the case that the decline in Christian democracy is a result of 
depillarization or whether depillarization is a result of the decline of Christian 
democratic power. Likely both means of analysis hold some truth, but even so it is 
fairly realistic to conclude that there is a causal relationship between the two 
phenomena. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the pillars derive some of their 
importance and usefulness from acting as a tool for Christian democratic parties, 
showing another way in which societal institutions do in fact play a unique and 
important role for Christian democracy. 
Beyond the way in which societal institutions play into formal political 
power for Christian democratic parties, it is also significant to note their continuing 
informal impact even in times when Christian democrats were no longer in power. 
It might seem that when the Christian democrats were not in the position to 
actively pursue policies which favored these institutions that the institutions would 
lose their impact. Gill and Lundsgaarde argue that “religious social mobilization 
and political involvement are more likely in countries with less extensive welfare 
systems and, conversely, that the expansion of state-sponsored social welfare will 
diminish, though not eliminate, the role religion will play in politics” (401). It 
follows logically that the size of the welfare state would correlate to the level of 
religious involvement in politics. Though this seems problematic for the idea that 
Christian democrats can create a unique welfare state because their very 
involvement is somehow inversely related to the presence of social provisions, this 
approach neglects the importance of informal political power which is inherent to 
the Christian democratic approach. While one embodiment of Christian democracy 
is in the use of the state for the common good, at least as important is the creation 
and use of intermediary institutions.  
In fact, the very existence of societal institutions and the depth of their 
entrenchment in society mean that they are able to play a primary role in the 
implementation of policy even with Christian democrats sidelined from 
government. For example, to this day nearly 100% of Catholic students still attend 
Catholic schools, which remain publicly funded, while Socialist parents also still 
send children to secular schools. Furthermore, "inter-pillar socialization, including 
intermarriage, is still relatively rare" (Evans 243). The persistence of this social 
segregation despite depillarization reflects the unique character of Christian 
democracy as a social movement whose influence does not depend only on a 
political party. In fact, even in the face of depillarization and the decline in 
Christian democratic political power the intermediary institutions developed within 
the pillars are still largely relied upon to provide welfare state services (Manow & 
van Kersbergen 141). It is this emphasis on the development of nongovernmental, 
community-based organizations for the implementation of social benefits that 
characterizes the unique nature of Christian democratic politics. 
 
The Christian Democratic Creation of Welfare Policy 
Christian Democratic parties are uniquely positioned to exert influence over 
social policy because they occupy the center of the spectrum.  While I have 
stressed the importance of informal political power in the forms of ideological 
offerings and intermediary institutions, of course formal political status is also of 
primary importance for Christian democrats and their policy influence. Contrary to 
traditional parties of the left and the right, Christian democracy is uniquely 
equipped and inclined to make a cross-class appeal for political support. This owes 
both to the fact that members of all classes are religious but also to some of the 
policies which Christian democrats espouse, specifically corporatism and social 
capitalism. The ideals of personalism, solidarity, and subsidiarity mean that the 
welfare policies of Christian democrats involve both interclass dialogue and social 
capitalism. Social capitalism, as described earlier is a sort of middle way between 
socialism and capitalism, utilizing the market for the allocation of resources but 
also allowing the state to intervene to correct market failures and to protect those 
who fall behind economically (van Kersbergen 1994, 40). These policies which 
incorporate some ideas from the left and right along with the Christian principles 
discussed earlier are unique to Christian democracy and relate to its strong centrist 
appeal. This constitutes both a distinctive tool for Christian democratic parties and 
a defining feature of their policy platform which emphasizes class compromise in 
accordance with the doctrine of solidarity. 
Iverson and Soskice write about the influence of political parties and their 
relationship to class divisions on welfare policy (166). They find that two-party 
systems result in smaller welfare states than systems with proportional 
representation. This owes to the fact that two-party systems embody only the left-
right class divide, and so the middle class faces a choice between higher taxes and 
redistribution on the left or lower taxes on the right. Thus, in the two-party system 
the middle class tends to side with the right, creating liberal, limited welfare 
policies. The US exemplifies the limited size of the welfare state produced by two-
party systems. In PR, however, the center is either able to be represented by some 
party of its own or at least along some lines more nuanced than the simple left-
right divide. PR creates a tendency for the middle class to side more with the left 
because it is less fearful of redistribution, believing it can have more influence over 
the level of taxation, and so the welfare state is more expansive in these systems. 
Overall, the middle class tends to play a very decisive role in granting power, so it 
is the opportunity of whatever party captures the middle class to influence what 
sort of welfare policy will be adopted (Manow & van Kersbergen 16).  
In the Swedish case, the social democratic party has been able to motivate 
the working class through the use of Marxist, class-based rhetoric. As a result of 
this success, the main influences on Swedish social policy have been “liberalism, 
agrarian interests, and social democracy,” which in turn drives social policy toward 
redistribution and an active role for the state (Anderson 232). In the Netherlands, 
however, Christian Democrats exercised control of the center for most of the 20
th
 
century, during which time “the Catholic People‟s Party had taken the lead in 
cabinet formation and played the role of mediator between other coalition members 
of the left and right; it had been the governing party par excellence” (Evans 241). 
Not only does this mean that Christian democracy was able to take on a major role 
in shaping welfare policy, but it was also able to usurp the secular point of view 
which, “though probably shared by a majority [in the Netherlands], has been 
divided by the permanent center occupied by the religiously-based CDA" (Evans 
244). This observation demonstrates the success of Dutch Christian democrats in 
not only capturing the support of the middle class but in fact of uniting several 
classes via the cross-cutting cleavage of religion. This owes largely to the presence 
of a real conflict along religious lines around the time of the formation of the 
Christian democratic parties because of anticlericalism which did not exist in the 
Swedish case as it has long had an established state church. However, it also owes 
to the nature of Christian democratic parties as seekers of social inclusion and class 
compromise.  
Part of what makes Christian democracy appealing across class lines is not 
only its religious appeal but also its distinct economic approach, social capitalism, 
which is based in the doctrines of subsidiarity, solidarity, and personalism. 
Essentially, this consists of an acknowledgement that the free market ought to be 
allowed its proper role in allocating resources, but that the state must also be 
willing to intervene to correct the injustices which are bound to occur as a result of 
the market, specifically poverty and the commodification of labor in a way that 
does not reward the dignity of the person and their work. This doctrine appeals 
across classes because it rewards work but also provides protection from market 
forces. The result of the success of Christian democratic parties in garnering 
support across class lines is that they had the power to implement a corporatist 
welfare model in the Netherlands which concentrates on dialogue between 
government, employers, and labor, thus perpetuating their appeal. 
As was previously mentioned, the postwar period in the Netherlands saw a 
decrease in the power of the Christian democrats and they were forced to create a 
black-red coalition with social democrats. It is interesting to observe that, in this 
postwar period, “the Dutch welfare state developed into a highly passive, transfer-
oriented, service-lean, yet highly generous, system that was tailored to income 
replacement for the typical male breadwinner-female carer [sic] household” (van 
Kersbergen 129). While the inclusion of social democrats in Dutch government did 
result in an increase in welfare state generosity, the welfare state still remained 
passive in a way that clearly owes to the Christian democratic influence. This 
development stands in contrast to states like Sweden where the unchallenged social 
democrats created broadly redistributive welfare states with the state taking an 
extremely active role.  
One question worth mentioning is what caused the loss of power for Dutch 
Christian democratic parties. Of course this is a difficult question to answer 
definitively and there are likely many contributing factors. As has been discussed, 
the decline in power does appear to be causally related to the process of 
depillarization. Both phenomena likely relate to the overall secularization of 
society in modern times, which may simply be a reflection of the less traditional 
values of current generations, but also likely owes to the lack of anticlerical 
persecution which united Christians at the formation of the Christian democratic 
movement. Whatever the cause, depillarization and the secularization of society 
means that votes along religious lines are no longer a guarantee, meaning that the 
population returns more heavily to the traditional class cleavages which Christian 
democrats attempt to bypass. This means that competition for the working class 
vote takes on a renewed intensity and Christian democrats, unwilling to use the 
rhetoric of class conflict to mobilize support, lose out on votes to the social 
democrats. This all follows the prediction that whichever party is able to command 
the middle class vote will hold the power, and so the division of the working class 
between social and Christian democratic parties necessitated the postwar red-black 
coalitions (van Kersbergen 2009). 
During the heyday of Christian democratic parties in the Netherlands, social 
policy closely followed the doctrines of subsidiarity and solidarity in focusing on 
establishing social order and stability. This includes welfare policy done along 
traditional gendered roles in an attempt to respect and utilize the institution of the 
family. It also includes the central role for intermediary institutions in the delivery 
of social services. These fundamental tenets of Christian democratic welfare policy 
were not compromised by cooperation with social democrats and actually helped to 
restrain welfare policy by coupling the expansion in the generosity of welfare 
programs with the maintenance of passive systems of delivery via both male 
breadwinners and societal institutions. Here the Swedish comparison is instructive 
in that it shows the type of active, interventionist state which develops under a 
social democratic party unrestrained by the influence of Christian democracy. The 
fact that the Dutch welfare state expanded in the postwar period no doubt owes to 
the influence of social democrats, but the fact that it remains passive is in spite of 
social democratic efforts. Again, Christian democracy proves uniquely able to steer 
welfare policy in a direction distinct from social democracy in both its underlying 
doctrine and its utilization of intermediary institutions.  
 
Conclusion 
Christian democracy offers a distinct alternative to other political parties in 
ideology, policy implementation, and political strategy. Its doctrine aims not to 
polarize but to unite and to uplift. The delivery of services is not through the state 
or the market but through delegation of authority to intermediary institutions. 
Power is not concentrated in the formal political arena but actually consists in its 
strength as a social movement with institutions that deliver services. In the formal 
political arena, Christian democratic parties find success through the ability to 
unite across class lines. The ideals of compromise, inclusion, and community are 
not only important to the type of policy Christian democrats advocate but also to 
the way in which they approach politics; consistent with those underlying 
principles are the unique methods employed by Christian democratic parties in 
utilizing social structures and informal political power while refusing class-based 
mobilization.  
The Christian democratic movement requires a particular kind of 
environment to flourish. Two-party systems do not support such cross-cutting party 
and with the increasing secularization of Europe and much of the rest of the world 
it seems that the social support needed for such a movement may only decrease 
over time. Secularization also means that there is not as much of the blatant 
anticlericalism which helped to motivate and enable the formation of confessional 
parties many years ago. Since the underlying conditions necessary for the 
formation of Christian democratic parties is so complex, the recommendation I 
believe Christian democracy can offer for the future is more in the area of the 
adoption of the doctrine which distinguishes the movement.  
The concepts of the inclusion of intermediary institutions and of class 
compromise can be applied even without the presence of a Christian democratic 
political party, as demonstrated by the passage of the faith-based initiative in the 
US which allows for the delivery of certain services through social institutions 
which are both secular and religious. As this paper has emphasized, formal 
political power, while very important, is not the only feature that distinguishes 
Christian democracy. Those hoping to find a way for Christian democratic ideals to 
continue to influence welfare policy can also focus on applying the doctrine in 
policy and in developing social structures which are able to take on their proper 
tasks of uplifting people and incorporating them into society. Even as the influence 
of Christian democracy declines in the formal political arena its ideals and 
institutions continue to offer a unique influence as a movement and ideology. 
Christian democracy is a distinct movement and it offers a clear alternative to 
liberal and social democratic conceptions of social policy which must be taken 
seriously as a comprehensive and compassionate approach to social policy. 
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